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STALEMATE IN AFGHANISTAN
DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN
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A REPORT

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UNITED STATES SENATE

BY

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PREFACE

The last year brought momentous changes to Southwest Asia. After ten years of military occupation and brutal warfare, the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan. In neighboring Pakistan, an 11-year military dictatorship ended abruptly and was replaced by a democratically elected government headed by a charismatic young leader, Benazir Bhutto.

Between August 13 and 14, I traveled to Pakistan to evaluate recent developments in Afghanistan and the transition to democracy in Pakistan. While in Islamabad, I met with Prime Minister Bhutto, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, members of the Federal Cabinet, and an array of journalists. In Peshawar, I had a luncheon meeting hosted by President Sigbatullah Mojadeddi of the Afghan Interim Government with key members of his cabinet. I visited the Khyber Pass, toured the Nasir Bagh refugee camp, and met with the Chief Minister of Northwest Frontier Province. In Karachi, I met with the Governor of Sind Province.

At each stop, I benefited from the hospitality, assistance and expertise of U.S. embassy and consular officials. Starting with our Ambassador Robert L. Oakley, the United States has an extraordinarily capable diplomatic representation in Pakistan.

Over the years I have had numerous conversations with Dr. Armand Hammer on the subject of Afghanistan. Dr. Hammer has been working to try to find a political solution and I have benefited from his views. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to Peter Galbraith of the Foreign Relations Committee staff, who accompanied me on this trip and whose expertise in matters South Asian was invaluable.

The attached report reflects my findings. That my analysis and recommendations of the Afghan situation differ from existing policy in no way reflects on the superb performance of our diplomatic team.

CLAIBORNE PELL,
Chairman.

FINDINGS

Afghanistan

- The conflict in Afghanistan is stalemated with the resistance holding the countryside and the Soviet-installed regime holding the principal cities. No change can be expected in the 1989 fighting season nor is there any prospect for a break in the stalemate in 1990.
- The reasons for military stalemate include massive Soviet support for their client People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) regime, the psychological boost given the regime by its successful defense of Jalalabad, and the inherent advantage of the city/fortress defense strategy adopted by the regime. The mujahideen have been unable to convert a guerilla movement aimed at denying an enemy control of the countryside into a conventional force capable of taking and holding urban areas. In addition, the mujahideen have suffered from internal disunity, a reduction in external supplies, and unrealistically high expectations. Finally, certain mujahideen actions, including the massacre of surrendering soldiers and rocket attacks on cities, have served to alienate some elements of the Afghan population.
- As long as Najibullah and his Soviet-installed regime remain in power in Kabul, armed opposition by the Afghan people will continue. On the other hand, the resistance's Afghan Interim Government (AIG) does not provide a credible alternative government. It lacks support from elements key to Afghanistan's future including commanders inside Afghanistan, educated expatriate Afghans, and refugees.
- U.S. interest in Afghanistan is primarily humanitarian and not strategic. The United States also has strong interest in a settlement that prevents the Afghanistan conflict from destabilizing neighboring Pakistan and facilitates the return from Pakistan of some 3.8 million refugees.
- A resolution of the Afghanistan war will require a political, not a military solution. So far the United States has placed too much emphasis on achieving an elusive military victory and too little on finding a political formula that will end the fighting and produce a government in Kabul acceptable to the Afghan people. The United States should work with Pakistan toward a political solution. Since neither negotiation nor compromise is possible between the discredited PDPA and the AIG, another formula for resolution of the conflict must be found.
- The most promising route to a political settlement would entail the establishment of a neutral government in Kabul for the purpose of conducting elections or calling a truly representative *loya jirga,* a traditional Afghan consultative assembly. The former King, Zahir Shah, is one truly national Afghan figure who might

be acceptable to both large segments of the mujahideen and the Soviet Union.

● In addition to promoting a political settlement, the United States should explore the possibility of an agreement on "negative symmetry" with the Soviet Union, that is a mutual cut-off of military supplies to each side's Afghan allies. Negative symmetry should help limit the destructiveness of a conflict that is now a civil war. It also may be strategically advantageous to the resistance since the West has neither the financial resources nor the logistical capability to match Soviet material support for the PDPA. An agreement on negative symmetry should include Soviet removal or destruction of a substantial part of the military equipment it has sent to Afghanistan over the past year.

Pakistan

● The new Pakistani government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has moved swiftly to restore democracy and full human rights. Pakistan's press is free, parliamentary debate robust, and, for the first time, the state media accord coverage to the opposition. All political prisoners have been released.

● Pakistan's politics today are vigorous and lively. In part, this is healthy, a reflection of the reemergence of democracy after eleven years of dictatorship. I am concerned, however, by the vehemence of the public statements of some politicians, by the endless maneuvering for political advantage, and by an unwillingness to compromise. All parties have a stake in the success of the current democratic government. All parties, including the opposition, will suffer if Pakistan's democracy is overthrown.

● Pakistan faces enormous economic and social problems. For example, over the past two decades, literacy has declined from 37 percent to 27 percent. Each year some 700,000 children under age 5 die, mostly from preventable illness. The success of Pakistan's democracy depends on the government's ability to make headway against these social problems. U.S. economic assistance to Pakistan, particularly in the areas of education and health, could help strengthen democracy.

STALEMATE IN AFGHANISTAN

A. *Introduction*

At noon on February 15, 1989, the last Soviet soldier stepped across the bridge separating Afghanistan from the Soviet Union. Many expected that the withdrawal would be followed in a matter of months, if not weeks, by the collapse of the Soviet-backed Kabul regime. Events have confounded these expectations.

Six months after the Soviet withdrawal, the Najibullah regime controls all significant population centers within Afghanistan. A major mujahideen offensive to take the key Afghan city of Jalalabad, which began shortly after the Soviet withdrawal, stalled well short of its objective and produced some of the heaviest rebel casualties of the war. Journalists and other visitors to Kabul report a new sense of confidence on the part of the regime. By contrast, a visitor to Peshawar hears pessimistic and critical assessments of the resistance propsects, although the resistance Afghan Interim Government (AIG) maintains a brave face.

The contrast between the rosy expectations of prompt mujahideen victory and current pessimisn is striking. However, the on-the-ground military situation is only slightly changed from that of February, and those changes favor the mujahideen. Nonetheless, the failure of the mujahideen to capitalize on the opportunities created by the Soviet withdrawal represents a real setback. Partly this setback is a result of continuing disunity among the mujahideen groups, a phenomenon that has seriously diminished mujahideen effectiveness throughout the war. Partly the Afghan freedom movement has been damaged by the excesses of several mujahideen organizations and some of their Arab allies. And, partly, the mujahideen are victims of exaggerated expectations of their strength and unrealistic assessments of the weakenss of the Kabul regime.

Whatever the reasons, the Afghan war has been a draw for the 1989 fighting season. And since the Kabul regime was not expected to be in the ring at the end of this year's round, its continued presence is seen as a considerable victory.

The stalemate is likely to continue into 1990. In any event, there is a need for a rethinking of U.S. Afghanistan policy. With a quick military solution unattainable, greater emphasis needs to be given to finding a political solution to the war. Such a solution can spare hundreds of thousands of Afghan lives by providing an early end to a conflict that has already caused more than a million deaths. If the stalemate continues, a political solution wil become important as a means of preventing the Lebanonization of Afghanistan and the destabilization of Pakistan.

B. *The Military Situation*

At the present time the Afghan freedom fighters, or mujahideen, can operate freely throughout the countryside of Afghanistan. The Soviet-installed People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) regime controls all significant urban centers. Through the decade of Soviet military intervention, neither the Red Army nor their Afghan allies were able to control any significant part of the countryside. Offensives aimed at dislodging the mujahideen from their mountain and valley strongholds proved costly in terms of men and material, and never achieved more than temporary success. As a result of the mujahideen's success in holding off Soviet actions outside the cities, the mujahideen were perceived as winning the war.

With the Soviet withdrawal the PDPA regime has settled into a purely defensive mode. The countryside, most villages, and almost all roads have ben conceded to the mujahideen. The mujahideen have been picking off isolated government forts and outposts. The loss of PDPA control has been particularly dramatic in the 18 months since the signing of the Geneva Accords. For example, at the time of Geneva, the PDPA controlled the Khyber Pass border crossing with Pakistan and the road to Jalalabad. Today the road is under mujahideen control and a visitor can drive to the outskirts of Jalalabad passing the checkpoints of different mujahideen factions.

In spite of an increase in resistance controlled territory, the eight months since the Soviet withdrawal have been widely seen as a period of significant set back for the mujahideen. The most notable reverse was the failed offensive against Jalalabad. The mujahideen assault on Jalalabad was characterized by poor co-ordination among different resistance groups, an inability to mobilize sufficient men to overcome the military advantage defenders have in this sort of situation, a failure to cut air or road links between Jalalabad and supply sources, and by relatively effective PDPA use of its relative advantage in firepower and its absolute advantage in air power.

The successful defense of Jalalabad has served to strengthen the PDPA's military and political position. Most important, Jalalabad enabled the regime to stave off a defeatist psychology. Many outside of Afghanistan, and some inside the country, expected the Soviet withdrawal would be followed by mass desertions from the Afghan army and the swift collapse of the regime. With Jalalabad, supporters of the PDPA can take comfort that there is some prospect for survival. This in turn may strengthen their resolve to resist.

The PDPA's new found military resolve has been accompanied by a massive infusion of weaponry and cash from the Soviet Union. At the time of the signing of the Geneva Accords (April 1988) the United States proposed the idea of "negative symmetry," or a mutual cut-off of weapons to the two sides. The Soviets rejected the proposal at that time, but in the Fall of 1988 put forward a negative symmetry of their own. This was rejected by the United States, which insisted that the Soviets pull out equipment sent in since the Spring.

Since the Fall of 1988, the Soviets sharply increased their deliveries of military supplies to the Kabul regime. Some U.S. officials estimate Soviet weapon deliveries this year at $300 million per month. While this figure seems high, there is no doubt that the Soviets have been providing the PDPA with massive amounts of military equipment including such sophisticated weaponry as the SCUD missile.

By contrast, the press and the mujahideen leaders report a significant drop off in supplies in the last ten months. There appear to be several reasons for this. First, anticipating a possible agreement on negative symmetry, deliveries to the mujahideen inside Afghanistan were reportedly accelerated in the latter part of 1988 leaving little in the pipeline for the 1989 fighting season. Second, turmoil in China in the first half of 1989 may have interrupted assistance from that country. Finally, anticipating a swift mujahideen victory many supporters reduced supplies. Thus, at exactly the time the Soviets were increasing their military support for the PDPA, supplies to the mujahideen were dramatically reduced. Tragically for the resistance, this also coincided with the heaviest and most equipment-intensive fighting of the war.

However, even had the friends of the mujahideen sustained their support, it could be no match for what the Soviets were doing. Logistically it is possible to pump large amounts of equipment into Kabul. By contrast, the pipeline to the guerillas inside Afghanistan can only carry so much. In retrospect, negative symmetry may not have been such a bad deal.

Soviet money and military equipment provides only part of the explanation for the PDPA's durability. The PDPA's base was never as weak as some Western analysts wished. In addition to a tiny core of dedicated communists, the PDPA retains support from elements in the bureaucracy, military, and urban business communities who have benefited from the billions expended in the country by the Soviet Union and therefore have a vested interest in the present system.

Probably the most important source of political support for the PDPA is, however, fear by urban Afghans of the mujahideen alternative. While these city dwellers may despise the PDPA as a tool of the Soviet invader, there is widespread apprehension that a mujahideen victory will lead to a fundamentalist Islamic regime. This is particularly true for women, who see the mujahideen as forcing them out of jobs and into the restricted confines of purdah. Fear of the future has been exacerbated by the conduct of some mujahideen groups since the Soviet withdrawal. In the Spring a group associated with one of the fundamentalist parties slaughtered some 80 PDPA soldiers as they attempted to defect to the resistance. More recently, guerillas allegedly associated with the Hezb-i-Islami Party of fundamentalist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar massacred a group of commanders associated with a rival mujahideen leader. These and similar incidents serve to persuade the city residents that they may be better off with the devil they know than the devil they don't. Needless to say, the regime does everything it can to reinforce this message.

In addition, mujahideen military tactics have served to alienate the civilian population inside the cities. Shellings have leveled

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large parts of the ancient city of Jalalabad and produced thousands of civilian casualties. Similarly, the rocket attacks on Kabul—undoubtedly intended for military targets—often fall on residential or commercial areas, suggesting to the inhabitants that the mujahideen are indifferent to civilian casualties or worse.

While the PDPA is stronger than most expected it would be at this point (after all, it was not expected to be around), the PDPA is unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of the Afghan people and cannot be expected to have a role in a future Afghan government. The Afghan people recognize the PDPA for what it is: a brutal communist regime sustained for a decade by the force of a superpower. Najibullah and his associates are widely perceived as quislings and collaborationists, even by urban residents. Any political strength the PDPA regime currently enjoys is essentially negative: that is, deriving from the weakness of the resistance.

C. *U.S. Policy Considerations*

The United States became involved in assisting the Afghan resistance for one reason only: to oppose the Soviet military occupation of the sovereign nation of Afghanistan. The reasons for U.S. involvement were strategic and moral. On a strategic plane, President Carter was unwilling to acquiesce in the extension of Soviet military force beyond the areas of Soviet dominion at the end of the Second World War. Further, some U.S. military thinkers saw the Soviet invasion as a prelude to Soviet expansion into Pakistan or Iran, a view that in retrospect does not square with the essentially reactive decision making that led to the invasion.

Morally, our assistance to the mujahideen constituted support for a backward people determined to fight a powerful invader with whatever means available. U.S. assistance helped even the odds for courageous men who preferred death to subjugation. This moral component to the U.S. policy was most eloquently reflected in the 1982 Tsongas Resolution, adopted unanimously by the U.S. Senate, which declared "It would be indefensible to provide the freedom fighters with only enough aid to fight and die but not to advance their cause of freedom."

Whether based on strategic or moral grounds, U.S. aid was intended to assist the mujahideen in throwing out the Soviet invader. A secondary objective of U.S. policy, but not per se of the military aid, was to facilitate the return to Afghanistan of 5 million refugees. By contrast, the overthrow of Afghanistan's communist government was not an original rationale for U.S. involvement in the Afghan conflict. The United States only got involved after the December 1979 Soviet invasion, which itself was some 20 months after the coup that brought the communists to power in Kabul. Early U.S. policy statements and related presidential determinations also reflected the limited U.S. goal. The question now is whether the United States is or should be committed to something beyond Soviet withdrawal: namely, the ouster of the PDPA regime. And, if so, what resources should the United States devote to this effort?

With the Soviets out, U.S. interests in Afghanistan are limited. Strategically, Afghanistan is unimportant to us. And even without the ravages of war Afghanistan would be of only minor economic interest. At most, our political interest in Afghanistan is psycholog-

ical. It is the place where Soviet aggression was checked and represents a triumph for U.S. policy. The ouster of the PDPA regime would presumably magnify our triumph as well as the Soviet's loss. However, with superpower relations no longer being a zero sum game, the importance of such a psychological victory is less apparent.

At this stage, I believe our interests in Afghanistan are preeminently humanitarian. Having supported the Afghan people for 10 years it would be wrong for us to abandon them now. With the Soviets gone, our policy should be aimed at bringing peace. A necessary condition for peace is the establishment of a government acceptable to the Afghan people. Only then can serious reconstruction and rehabilitation work go forward.

While the U.S. strategic interest in Afghanistan is limited, our interest in Pakistan is quite large. The continuation of the Afghan war is destabilizing to Pakistan in two ways.

First, Pakistan has for more than ten years generously hosted the bulk of the Afghan refugees. Natural increase and new arrivals have increased the size of this population to 3,800,000 from 2,000,000 in 1980. As the international community provides only part of the sustenance the refugees require and has declined to register some new arrivals, a significant part of the burden for care of the refugees falls on Pakistan. As the international community loses interest in Afghanistan, the economic burden on Pakistan will increase. For a country desperately needing to find resources to met its own economic and social problems, it is an expense Pakistan can ill afford.

Second, the continued presence of the refugees and the armed Afghan resistance provides a danger the Afghans will get involved in domestic Pakistani politics. This involvement is being encouraged by some politicians associated with the late dictator General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, whose memory commands scant affection from Pakistanis but is regarded with the reverence due a fallen friend by the Afghans. So far, the Afghan resistance leadership has stayed out of Pakistan politics but this could change if the Afghan war drags on.

It is our political and strategic interests in Pakistan, as well as our humanitarian interest in Afghanistan, that mandate our continued involvement in the Afghanistan issue. All these interests are served by finding an early end to the war.

D. *The Need for a Political Solution*

As long as the PDPA survives, the military conflict will continue. The PDPA is so thoroughly hated by so many Afghans, that armed resistance will continue even if external assistance is cut off.

On the other hand, the alternative to the PDPA—the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) of the resistance—does not seem to have enough military clout or political support to oust the PDPA. The AIG is rent by internal dissension and has failed to win the support of large segments of the anti-communist Afghan community. The AIG consists of seven Peshawar-based political parties, four described as "fundamentalists" and three as "moderates." One of the moderate parties, the royalist National Islamic Front of Afghanistan has declined to participate fully in the government; the funda-

mentalist Hezb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is boycotting the AIG over AIG efforts to investigate the charge that Hekmatyar's group massacred commanders of a rival faction.

Even if the AIG were to pull itself together it is not clear that it enjoys much support among the Afghan people. The commanders inside Afghanistan, who almost certainly embody the real power in the country, by in large did not participate in the Pakistani-sponsored *shura* (consultative council) that set up the AIG. While many of these commanders owe nominal allegiance to the parties in the AIG (party membership has been a prerequisite for access to foreign weapons), these allegiances are tenuous. The AIG has yet to command any significant support from educated Afghan expatriates, whose participation in the reconstruction of Afghanistan will be critical, or from the refugees.

With neither the PDPA or AIG able to prevail militarily, at least in the near term, the United States and Pakistan should increase their efforts to find a political solution. Given the widespread perception of the PDPA as traitors, it is unrealistic to expect the AIG to enter into a compromise with the PDPA and the United States should not seek to promote such a compromise. However, in light of its recent military successes it is equally unlikely to expect the PDPA to agree to a transfer of power to the AIG or some other resistance entity.

The best hope for a political solution to the Afghan conflict lies, in my judgement, in the creation of a neutral government that might supervise some form of elections or other act of self-determination in the country. The nature of the neutral government and the modalities for self-determination are a matter for negotiation. However, one option that seems to have broad support among the Afghan refugees and expatriates, and which may be acceptable to the Soviets and to Kabul, would involve the return of the former King, Zahir Shah.

Zahir Shah, who was King of Afghanistan from 1933 until he was ousted by his brother-in-law in a 1973 coup, is associated with a period of relative peace and prosperity in Afghanistan. Since his ouster he has lived in a villa outside Rome and been relatively removed from the turbulent politics of his homeland. This relative non-involvement makes him a good compromise candidate between the PDPA and the resistance, although some of the fundamentalist political parties strongly resent his non-participation in the jihad (holy war) against the Soviet invader. At age 74, Zahir Shah is assumed not to have extensive political ambitions of his own and this too enhances his appeal.

With the installation of a transitional neutral government, the process of self-determination could go forward either through elections or through the peculiarly Afghan institution of a loya jirga or grand consultative council. In this case the loya jirga would include the tribal chieftains, representatives of the Peshawar-based political parties, representatives of the Teheran-based Shia groups, and some elements from the current Kabul regime and administrative apparatus. While Najibullah and his top lieutenants can expect no role in this process, most resistance groups are prepared to accept what they call "good Muslims" from Kabul. Presumably, this in-

cludes some people from the current army, from the bureaucracy, and from the lower ranks of the PDPA.

Essential to the conduct of a successful loya jirga or of elections is its sponsorship by a neutral government. Both the PDPA and the resistance have attempted to stage consultative councils of their own without real success. In late 1987 the PDPA sponsored a loya jirga which was rightly seen as a propaganda exercise. In February and March of 1989 the resistance held a shura (another form of consultative council) in Islamabad which produced the AIG. The conduct of the shura was dictated by the then head of the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) who was subsequently ousted by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Because of its ISI sponsorship, only the Peshawar-based resistance parties participated and this in part explains why the institution emerging from the shura has been able to develop broad support.

A loya jirga sponsored by Zahir Shah could draw in enough different elements so that any government emerging from it could claim to speak for the Afghan nation. A truly representative loya jirga, in turn, could do much to reassure vital elements of Afghan society—city dwellers and expatriates among them—about a future dominated by the resistance. A scenario involving a neutral government providing the transition to a broad based Afghan government does not require the participation of Zahir Shah. However, it is my judgement that his prominence would make the task of such a neutral government less complicated.

I would also hope that there might be a United Nations role in supervising any act of self-determination by the Afghan people, be it elections or a loya jirga. U.N. observers would give the parties involved, and such outside patrons as the USSR, confidence about the fairness of the procedures. U.N. peacekeeping and observers can have a role in facilitating an Afghan political settlement. They cannot, as the Najibullah regime has proposed, impose a settlement. The United Nations does not have the resources to keep the peace in Afghanistan for the purpose of holding elections unless such elections are held by the consent of all parties.

Finally, I would note that any government that emerges in Afghanistan, whether through elections, a loya jirga, or force of arms, is likely only to have very limited authority. It will be much easier to find a political solution if it is assumed the new government's responsibilities will be limited to foreign affairs, defense, administration of the capital, and few other functions. Historically, Kabul has not exercised extensive authority over Afghanistan's numerous tribal and feudal leaders. After more than a decade of war, these leaders are used to great autonomy and have the material means to defend their autonomy. This is a reality that must be recognized.

E. *The Future of U.S. Assistance*

Although I have serious reservations about the practicality of an Afghanistan policy aimed at military victory, I do not believe the Congress should take any unilateral action to eliminate or diminish our assistance to Afghan resistance. Any suggestion that the United States, and other friends of the mujahideen, might lose interest provides a strong incentive for the Soviets to continue their military supply relationship with the PDPA. It would also encour-

age a belief by Najibullah and his top associates that they might be able to survive politically. Since, as I noted before, the resistance will continue the struggle against Najibullah with or without external assistance, a unilateral aid reduction would prolong the Afghan war, and thus increase Afghan suffering as well as the danger to Pakistan.

I do believe the United States should aggressively explore with the Soviet Union a possible agreement on negative symmetry, that is a mutual cut-off of assistance to our respective Afghan friends. Negative symmetry would lessen the bloodiness of the Afghan war and, as I explained above, could have distinct military advantages to the mujahideen. Any deal on negative symmetry should include a Soviet commitment to withdraw or destroy a substantial part of the military equipment it has poured into Afghanistan since the signing of the Geneva Accords. Such an agreement should also be accompanied by a major diplomatic initiative to find a political solution to the war.

DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN

A. *Internal Developments*

Having long pressed for the return of democracy and respect for human rights in Pakistan, I was gratified that my trip provided an opportunity to visit with Pakistan's new democratic government. I was impressed by the commitment of all parties with whom I met, including the Prime Minister, the President, and the military, to the success of democracy.

Democracy in Pakistan is flourishing. In her first act after assuming office December 2, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto ordered the release of all political prisoners. Press controls have been lifted and, on Bhutto's instructions, the state television and radio provide for the first time regular coverage of the opposition activities.

In the National Assembly there is an emerging two party system which provides for healthy debate. Power in the country is divided, with the ruling Pakistan People's Party controlling a majority in the National Assembly while the Senate (elected in the Zia era) has a two thirds IJI (Islamic Democratic Alliance) majority. The PPP controls the Sind and the Northwest Frontier Province while the IJI has a majority in the populous Punjab Province.

This division of authority has created problems for the government, especially since Pakistan's constitution devolves very substantial power to the provinces. The central government is facing difficulties in implementing its social and human services programs in the Punjab. Compromise is an essential feature of democratic life and, eventually, the center and province will have to work out a modus vivendi. It is not surprising that, with so little experience in democratic government, there is now a period of sorting out.

Key to the success of democracy in Pakistan is the role of the military, and in particular, the army. In the past, the army has stepped in to terminate Pakistan's brief experiments with elected governments, the most recent being General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq's ouster of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the father of the current Prime Minister.

At this stage, the army appears to be fully committed to the success of Pakistan's democratic government. Indeed, the new Chief of the Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, played the critical role in ensuring a transition to democracy after Zia's death last August. More broadly, the army seems to recognize that military rule damages its standing in the country and can corrupt the institution itself. Further, military rule in Pakistan encourages anti-national forces particularly in the Sind and Baluchistan, provinces essentially unrepresented in the military.

Pakistanis, including the army recognize that democracy—and in particular the election as Prime Minister of a charismatic young woman—has greatly enhanced the country's international reputa-

tion. This has been reflected in the decision of aid donors to increase significantly assistance to Pakistan.

The Foreign Relations Committee has supported democracy by accepting my proposal for our first ever earmark of economic assistance for Pakistan, and at a level $30 million above last year. Congressional support for democracy has also yielded dividends for the Pakistan military. Compare, for example, the treatment of F-16 sales in 1981 under the Zia dictatorship and this year. In 1981, in spite of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, a resolution to disapprove of the sale of 40 F-16 aircraft only narrowly failed in the House and Senate foreign affairs committees (13-13 was the House committee vote; the Senate committee vote was 9-7). This year, even without the justification provided by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, there was no opposition to the sale of 60 F-16's voiced in the U.S. Senate. Without democracy it is unlikely such a sale would have been proposed, much less approved.

In spite of Pakistan's rocky history, democracy seems to be getting well established. As outlined above, this undoubtedly reflects the interest all elements of Pakistani society have in the success of democracy.

I must, however, mention one discordant note. While debate and some level of acrimony are features of democratic society, I was disturbed by the virulence of some of the political rhetoric in Pakistan today. For example, one opposition leader asserted that, if he came to power, he would try the Prime Minister for terrorism. Another opposition politician seemed in one of his statements to be inviting a military takeover. The government, too, has sometimes been too strong in its rhetoric. One minister, for example, asserted that the current President—in my judgement a very fine and decent man—was worse than the previous military dictator.

The opposition has as much stake in democracy as does the government. (Here the lesson of 1977 is instructive. Then, opposition Pakistan National Alliance agitated for military action against the PPP government. The resulting military coup, however, left the PNA in the political wilderness and eventually the PNA leaders joined the PPP in opposition to the military dictatorship.) All parties should remember, in their rhetoric and action, that they have common interest in the success of democracy.

B. *Foreign Policy*

Benazir Bhutto has successfully exploited the international fascination with her to the benefit of Pakistan. She has made a number of highly successful foreign trips, including to the United States, which have helped produce, as noted above, increased aid commitments.

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is now extremely strong, perhaps the best it has been in the 42 year history of bilateral relations. Contrary to expectations, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan has not led to a diminution of U.S. interest in Pakistan. As the Prime Minister noted in her June 7 address to the joint meeting of Congress, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is now based on a shared commitment to democracy and human rights.

In this connection, the Prime Minister proposed, also during her U.S. visit, the creation of a new international organization to pro-

mote democracy. Her proposed organization, the Association of Democratic Nations (ADN), would sponsor activities similar to those carried out bilaterally by our National Endowment for Democracy (NED). These include organizing election observer missions, assistance in building democratic institutions, and mutual support activities for democratic nations. As a multilateral effort initiated by a Third World country, the ADN may be able to enhance democracy in a way the made-in-the-USA NED cannot. In any event, the United States should follow the ADN initiative and provide support as needed.

Prime Minister Bhutto seems to have established a good rapport with the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Gandhi has twice visited Pakistan since Bhutto took over and the visits have produced some modest agreements including a pact not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. Considerable progress has also been made in defusing a dispute over control of the Siachen Glacier, a conflict in which altitude sickness has taken far more lives than the occasional exchange of artillery and gunfire.

The Indo-Pakistan dialogue is critical to both countries. Not only can it ease longstanding tension, but a better relationship would allow both countries to divert scarce resources from military purposes to desperately needed economic development. It is a dialogue the United States should encourage.

Here I would note that Prime Minister Bhutto's effort by improve relations with India have been sharply criticized by the opposition who accuse her of being "pro-India." Ironically, she is pursuing a policy initiated by her predecessor, General Zia, who three times went to New Delhi in search of better relations. Prime Minister Bhutto, however, has been far more successful in obtaining concessions from the Indians that Zia could not obtain.

The one issue that could enormously complicate Pakistan's foreign policy is the nuclear issue. Further Pakistan progress toward acquisition of a nuclear weapon could, pursuant to U.S. law, cause the termination of our assistance relationship, as well as spark a full-scale nuclear arms race with India. The Bhutto government seems to understand the dangers inherent in Pakistan's nuclear program, and the Prime Minister has promised that Pakistan will not manufacture a nuclear explosive device. To those who recall the non-nuclear promises of General Zia, many of which turned out to be lies, Prime Minister Bhutto asserts that the word of a democratic government is more trustworthy. The Prime Minister's commitment seems to have defused the nuclear issue with the United States for the time being, but its disruptive potential remains.

I would hope and expect the Administration will keep the nuclear issue high on the U.S.-Pakistan agenda. Meanwhile, efforts should be stepped up to develop a regional approach to nuclear proliferation involving India and perhaps also China.

C. *Economic Problems*

Pakistan today is paying a terrible price for its neglect of its human resources. A few statistics tell the tale.

In 1965, Pakistan and South Korea had the same per capita income. Today South Korea's per capita income exceeds Pakistan's by a factor of ten.

In the last 20 years, adult literacy in Pakistan has declined from 37 percent to 27 percent, reflecting a shocking neglect of eduction. In Baluchistan female literacy is around one percent.

Most distressing are Pakistan's child mortality figures. Each year 700,000 Pakistani children die under the age of five. Most of these deaths are preventable.

Popular expectations for Benazir Bhutto's democratic government are very high. However, unless she is able to address problems such as the ones outlined above, she will fail. And if she fails, Pakistan's democratic experiment may also fail.

U.S. and other external assistance can help Pakistan meet the needs and expectations of 100 million people. However, assistance alone is not enough. Pakistan must improve its security environment to both the East and the West if resources are to become available for pressing social needs. The United States needs to continue to be engaged with Pakistan, India and the Soviet Union in the effort to settle conflicts and reduce tensions in South Asia.

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